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BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED:
DEMOCRATIZING THE ECONOMY IN THE
WAKE OF THE SMALL-DOLLAR
REVOLUTION
JAY HEDGES*

INTRODUCTION

A. Kshama and Goliath
In November 2019, Amazon poured $1.45 million into a local city
council election in Seattle, Washington to back business-friendly
candidates.1 Of that spending, $440,000 went to one district race
against the incumbent socialist councilwoman, Kshama Sawant.2
Sawant had led an effort to enact a head-tax on large corporations
in the city, including Amazon, the city’s largest employer.3 The
measure initially passed unanimously, but after backlash from
Amazon, the tax was revoked by the council.4 Amazon would not
*Research
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1 See Alexander Sammon, Seattle’s Biggest Corporations Try to Buy the City Council,
AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 22, 2019), https://prospect.org/power/seattles-biggest-corporations-tryto-buy-the-city-council.
2 See Hallie Golden, Blow to Amazon as Seattle Socialist Looks to have Triumphed in
Key Vote, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/nov/09/seattle-amazon-kshama-sawant-socialist-elections.
3 See Jared Goyette, Is Amazon Taking Revenge on the Seattle Socialist Who Took On
the Retail Giant?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2019, 11:37 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/05/amazon-seattle-councilwoman-kshama-sawant-re-electionbid.
4 See Alana Semuels, How Amazon Helped Kill a Seattle Tax on Business, ATLANTIC
(June 13, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/06/how-amazonhelped-kill-a-seattle-tax-on-business/562736/.
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take its chances with another term for Councilwoman Sawant.5
On election night, the candidate backed by Amazon, Egan Orion,
led by eight percent of the vote.6 News outlets blared the victory
whistle, declaring Amazon’s defeat of socialism.7
Yet these declarations proved premature. Due to Washington’s
mail-in ballot system, it would be days before the final results were
tallied.8 The final count showed Sawant had, in fact, surpassed her
Amazon-backed opponent.9 When Sawant declared victory, the
background banner of her speech read in large block letters, “Tax
Amazon.”10
How did the socialist enemy of one of the world’s largest corporations seek out an electoral victory over the corporation’s preferred candidate? At least some anecdotal accounts indicated that
voters were disturbed by Amazon’s unprecedented money dump
into the election.11 The refrain Sawant chose to use at her rallies,
to great applause, reflected this distaste: “Seattle is not for sale!”12
Her opponent even admitted that the Amazon donations became
more of a distraction than an advantage.13 So, it appears that this
distaste for corporate political influence, as well as Sawant’s unashamedly pro-working-class message, resonated with voters.14
5 See Golden, supra note 2.
6 See id.
7 See Evie Fordham, Far-Left Candidates Appear to Flop in Seattle City Council Race

After Amazon Dumps Dollars, FOX BUS. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/amazon-city-council-seattle-election-results; see also Katie Herzog, Maybe Amazon
Bought the Election—or Maybe Voters Were Sick of Sawant, THE STRANGER (Nov. 7, 2019,
10:58 AM), https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2019/11/07/41927073/maybe-amazonbought-the-election-or-maybe-voters-were-sick-of-sawant.
8 See Eoin Higgins, Amazon’s Major Money Dump in Seattle’s City Council Election
Seen as ‘Dangerous and Ominous Development’, COMMON DREAMS (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/11/06/amazons-major-money-dump-seattlescity-council-election-seen-dangerous-and-ominous.
9 See Hannah Knowles, Amazon Spent $1.5 Million on Seattle City Council Races. The
Socialist it Opposed Has Won, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2019, 11:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/11/10/amazon-spent-million-seattle-city-council-races-socialist-it-opposed-has-won/.
10 See Evie Fordham, Amazon vs Seattle Socialist City Councilwoman: Why She Could
Have Last Laugh, FOX BUS. (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/socialistseattle-city-councilwoman-kshama-sawant-amazon.
11 See Joni Batler, How Amazon’s Klutzy Politicking Backfired in Seattle, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 14, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-11-14/howamazon-s-klutzy-politicking-backfired-in-seattle (citing polls conducted before Amazon’s
donations that favored Amazon-friendly candidates, most of whom ended up losing their
election).
12 See Knowles, supra note 9.
13 See Batler, supra note 11.
14 See Jonathan Rosenblum, Kshama Sawant Passes the Amazon Stress Test in Seattle,
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B. The Anti-Democracy of Citizens United
The infamous Supreme Court decision that gave Amazon the
green light to spend as much money as it did in the city council
election is Citizens United v. FEC.15 The 2010 decision made clear
two constitutional concepts: (1) a corporation is to be treated like
a person with constitutional rights,16 and (2) the money a corporation spends towards political ends is constitutionally protected
speech.17 The ruling has been widely unpopular,18 and it exposes
the dearth of democracy in our capitalist political economy.19
Citizens United increases the power of corporations over our political process.20 Under current corporate governance laws, permission for corporations to behave as political actors ignores the
consent of a particularly important constituency of these business
entities—labor.21 This neglect of workers reveals three democratic
crises resulting from the corporate structure in the United States,
JACOBIN (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/11/kshama-sawant-seattlecity-council-election-amazon (describing the Sawant campaign’s field strategy of focusing
grassroots community organizing in working-class neighborhoods to turn out the vote).
15 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
16 See id. at 312–13.
17 See id. at 313–14. Although corporations are still prevented from contributing directly to political campaigns, they may make independent expenditures to advocate for or
against politicians without coordinating with their campaigns. See id. at 360.
18 See Greg Stohr, Bloomberg Poll: Americans Want Supreme Court to Turn Off Political Spending Spigot, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-28/bloomberg-poll-americans-want-supreme-court-to-turnoff-political-spending-spigot (finding that while respondents were divided on whether they
agreed with rulings on abortion, gay marriage, and health care, seventy-eight of survey
respondents, upset by the flood of political spending the decision unleashed, said that Citizens United should be overturned).
19 See Kent Greenfield, The Stakeholder Strategy: Changing Corporations, Not the Constitution, is the Key to a Fairer Post-Citizens United World, 26 DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS (2012)
(“Here in the United States, the law of corporate governance is among the most conservative and least democratic in the developed world.”).
20 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 433 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he [Tillman] Act
[which bans all direct corporate contributions to political candidates] was . . . driven by . . .
the enormous power corporations had come to wield in federal elections.”) (emphasis added);
RICHARD D. WOLFF, DEMOCRACY AT WORK: A CURE FOR CAPITALISM 94 (2012) (discussing
the increased concentration of political power in corporations following Citizens United,
Wolff writes, “[t]he disparity of interests between capitalists and workers and the disparity
of the concentrated resources they can and do devote to their favored positions, politicians,
and parties undermine a democratic politics.”).
21 See Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law,
2019 WISC. L. REV. 451, 453, 462, 464–65 (2019) (pointing out how Citizens United loosely
describes corporations as an association of persons while at the same time failing to
acknowledge how employees make up the majority of this association yet have no ability to
direct the speech of the corporation).
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which have only intensified following Citizens United. First, while
the political speaking-power of corporations has been substantially increased, these entities lack legitimacy to speak on behalf
of their labor constituency.22 Second, the use of corporate profits,
generated by the corporation’s labor force, as the means of political
speech accelerates worker exploitation.23 And third, given the
United States’ consensus that the corporation’s purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth,24 greater corporate influence in the political arena increases political power to prioritize shareholders,
escalating the already soaring economic and social inequality in
the United States.25 In light of these crises, the result of Citizens
United is anti-democratic.26
C. Beyond Citizens United
In spite of the anti-democracy exacerbated by Citizens United,
the decision has opened the door to a particularly compelling political narrative regarding the excess of corporate power.27 This
narrative has proved increasingly successful in electing

22 See ISABELLE FERRERAS, FIRMS AS POLITICAL ENTITIES: SAVING DEMOCRACY
THROUGH ECONOMIC BICAMERALISM 13 (Miranda Richmond Mouillot ed. trans., Cambridge

Univ. Press 2017) (“Firm government today is illegitimate, because it represents only one
of the firm’s two constituent bodies.”).
23 See infra Subsection II.B, notes 120–148 and accompanying text.
24 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 53 (2008) (“[D]espite occasional academic arguments to the contrary, the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . indisputably is the law in the United States.”).
25 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 377 (Arthur Goldhammer, trans., Harv. Press 2014) (2013) (conducting groundbreaking empirical research
that demonstrates rising wealth inequality in the United States and other Western capitalist democracies).
26 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (“[The state law restricting corporate political
expenditures] aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: corrosive and
distorting effects of immense wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to the public’s
support for the corporation’s political ideas.”). See also Charles Douglas Lummis, The Radicalism of Democracy, 2 DEMOCRACY 9, 9–10 (Fall 1982) (“[Democracy] describes an ideal,
not a method of achieving it. It is not a kind of government but an end of government; not
a historically existing institution, but a historical project.”).
27 See Adam Eichen & Nick Nyhart, Grassroots Money Beats Amazon in Seattle, AM.
PROSPECT (Nov. 15, 2019), https://prospect.org/politics/grassroots-money-beats-amazon-inseattle/ (Though “[c]orporate independent expenditures exceeded progressive ones in every
contested council race,” Amazon’s favored candidates challenging progressives for Seattle
City Council lost five out of six races.).
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candidates who reject corporate support.28 Thus, politicians are
showing that they can compete in and even win elections while
rejecting corporate money.29
Ironically, Citizens United has acted as a foil against which the
working class can build political power.30 This political power,
once achieved, should not aim merely to overturn Citizens United,
but to get to the heart of the anti-democracy it upholds by democratizing corporations.31 Two corporate reforms would be effective
and straightforward ways to democratize corporations: (1) Worker
Ownership Funds and (2) economic bicameralism.32 These
measures would redistribute power in the workplace, countering
the illegitimacy, exploitation, and inequality which Citizens
United has promoted.33
These two corporate reforms would increase worker ownership
and control of the corporations they work for. First, through
Worker Ownership Funds, all workers, as shareholders, would
28 See Alex Kotch, The Verdict Is In: Rejecting Corporate Cash Wins Elections, SLUDGE
(Nov. 15, 2018, 5:48 PM), https://readsludge.com/2018/11/15/rejecting-corporate-pacs-winselections-verdict/. In the 2018 mid-term elections, thirty Democratic congressional candidates who unseated Republicans had rejected corporate Political Action Committee (PAC)
money, while each candidate virtually matched or exceeded the fundraising of their corporate-friendly opponent. See id.
29 See id. In recognition of this development, the Democratic National Committee made
the number of individual donors, rather than the total amount of money raised, part of the
qualifying criteria for the 2020 Democratic Presidential primary debates, emphasizing the
breadth of a candidate’s grassroots support. See Press Release, Democratic Nat’l Committee, DNC Announces Details for The First Two Presidential Primary Debates (Feb 14, 2019),
https://democrats.org/news/dnc-announces-details-for-the-first-two-presidential-primarydebates/; see also Michael Whitney, The DNC Is Putting Its Thumb on the Scales Again —
This Time in the Right Direction, INTERCEPT (Dec. 27, 2018, 7:01 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/12/27/dnc-primary-grassroots-fundraising/.
30 Patrick Burgwinkle, the communications director of the End Citizens United PAC,
expressed the power of using Citizens United to raise money for candidates who oppose
the ruling, explaining that “[g]etting money out of politics . . . is often a very powerful
grassroots fund-raising message.” Eric Lach, Why Famous, Powerful Presidential Candidates are Begging You for Five Dollars, NEW YORKER (June 10, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-famous-powerful-presidential-candidates-are-begging-you-for-five-dollars.
31 See Greenfield, supra note 19 (arguing against liberal proposals to overrule Citizens
United via a constitutional amendment declaring that corporations are no longer protected
by the First Amendment).
32 See Ferreras, supra note 22, at 13–14 (introducing the idea of “economic bicameralism” as a solution to the anti-democracy of firms); see also Lenore Palladino, Inclusive
Ownership Funds for the United States, ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (May 15, 2019), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/inclusive-ownership-funds-for-the-united-states/ (describing the potential benefits of employee ownership funds in the United States). For an argument as to
why corporate reform cannot merely be “voluntary” or flow from “enlightened leadership,”
see MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE CORPORATE
ARISTOCRACY 147–49 (2001).
33 See infra Section II.
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benefit from corporate profits through dividends and participate
in corporate governance with the same voting rights direct shareholders currently possess.34 Second, the model of “economic bicameralism” designed by Isabelle Ferreras would increase workers’
control and corporate accountability to labor.35
Increased ownership and control for workers would (1) legitimize corporations as political actors granted constitutional rights,
(2) mitigate exploitation by both redistributing a portion of the corporate profits to workers and giving workers a say in how those
profits ought to be used, and (3) reduce inequality by increasing
workers’ corporate equity and giving the diverse working-class
equal standing and responsibility with current corporate boards.
By gaining such a degree of ownership and control over the economic forces governing their lives, workers would see society begin
to make good on its promise of democracy.
This Note will map a path forward beyond the seeming political
limitations of Citizens United. Part I will provide an overview of
Citizens United and its consequences on democracy. Part II will
elaborate on the crises of illegitimacy, exploitation, and inequality
exacerbated by Citizens United. And, Part III will examine two
possible corporate reforms, and their ability to combat the illegitimacy, exploitation, and inequality facilitated by Citizens United.
Finally, Part IV argues that recent developments around how political campaigns are financed reveal the political viability of these
reforms.

34 See generally, Susan R. Holmberg, Who Are the Shareholders?, ROOSEVELT INST. 8
n.2 (June 2018) (analyzing the key distinction between the rights of direct shareholders and
those who invest in corporate equity through large institutional investors).
35 See Ferreras, supra note 22, at 14. Economic bicameralism is a governing structure
for companies where workers as “labor-investors” help make the strategic decisions of the
corporation through a board of representatives that has equal standing with shareholders’
representatives who are the sole directors in corporations’ current “unicameral” system. Id.
at 137.
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BACKGROUND

A. Citizens United
Citizens United held that the government could not ban political
speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.36 The decision
overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which held
that corporations could not make independent political expenditures from their general treasury.37 Instead, Austin had upheld
the Political Action Committee (PAC) system of campaign financing outlined by the Federal Elections Commission.38 Under that
system, corporate PACs had specific regulations on funding.39 For
instance, only certain designated corporate constituents could contribute to the fund, and the political purpose of the PAC had to be
known to contributors beforehand.40 Thus, only consciously made
donations to the fund could be used for the fund’s express political
purpose. But Citizens United held that banning the use of a corporation’s general treasury for independent political expenditures
violated the First Amendment’s enshrined freedom of speech.41
One of the key issues the Court needed to address to arrive at
its decision was the applicability of First Amendment free speech
guarantees to corporations. Yet the Court weakly defended its
36 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010).
37 Id.; Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990).
38 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 669 (Brennan, J. concurring) (“[T]he statute merely requires

those corporations wishing to make independent expenditures in support of candidates to
do so through segregated funds or political action committees (PAC’s) rather than directly
from their corporate treasuries.”).
39 See id. at 657 (“For example, the statute required the corporation to appoint a treasurer for its segregated fund, keep records of all contributions, file a statement of organization containing information about the fund, and update that statement periodically.”).
40 See id. (“[T]he corporation was permitted to solicit contributions to its segregated
fund only from ‘members,’ which did not include persons who merely contributed to or indicated support for the organization.”).
41 See generally, Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349, 361-62 (“This case . . . is about independent expenditures . . . . When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that
finding due deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional remedy. If elected
officials succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures[] . . . then surely
there is cause for concern . . . . The remedies enacted by law, however, must comply with
the First Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the
governing rule. An outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical preelection
period is not a permissible remedy. . . . [Accordingly, t]he regulatory mechanism here, based
on speech, contravenes the First Amendment.”).
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commitment to corporate personhood through a series of string citations listing previous decisions that had applied First Amendment protections to corporations.42 One peculiar feature of the
Court’s leap in logic is that the majority of the cases it cites as
support for protecting all corporations’ freedom of speech involved
media corporations, which arguably implicates the First Amendment’s freedom of the press in addition to free speech.43 Two legal
scholars point out that Justice Kennedy’s argument here is a syllogism.44 The authors write:
The First Amendment protects the press; the
press often uses the corporate form; therefore, the
First Amendment protects the political speech of
corporations. . . . [B]y adopting the financial advantages of the corporate form, media companies
have now, through Citizens United, extended political speech protections to commercial, nonmedia corporations.45
Next, the Court rejected the reasons in Austin for upholding regulation of corporate political spending: (1) anti-distortion, (2) anticorruption, and (3) shareholder protection.46 The Court in Austin
held that the use of a corporation’s general treasury money was a
form of distortion because there was no way to know the actual
42 See id. at 342 (“The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends
to corporations. [First Nat’l Bank v.] Bellotti, [435 U.S. 765], at 778, n. 14, . . . (citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 . . . ; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
. . . ; Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 . . . ; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546 . . . ; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 . . . ; Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 . . . ; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 . . . ; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 . . . ; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
. . . ; Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U.S. 684 . . . ; Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 . . . ); see, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180 . . . ; Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 . . . ; Turner, 512 U.S. 622 . . . ; Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 105 . . . ; Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 . . . ; Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524
. . . ; Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 . . . ; Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 . . . ; Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 . . . ; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 . . . ; Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing
Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 . . . .”)).
43 See id. at 342-43.; see also Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court
as Prometheus: Breathing Life into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 536–
37 (2012).
44 See Sprague & Wells, supra note 43, at 536–37.
45 Id.
46 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348-63.
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popularity or support for the promoted political position.47 Responding to this anti-distortion interest, Citizens United asserted
that the “First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves,” and, thus, regardless of the veracity of information being
offered, people should sort out the truth themselves.48
Austin also expressed concern that increased corporate political
expenditures for candidates could yield corruption or its appearance.49 However, Citizens United found that the prohibition of corporate donations in the form of direct campaign contributions was
a sufficient guard against the quid pro quo corruption of which
Austin had warned.50
Austin further noted that some minority shareholders, whose
money would be used for these political purposes, might disagree
with the ideas being advanced.51 Regarding this government interest in protecting shareholders, Citizens United offered two rebuttals.52 First, the Court asked, if minority shareholders in media
corporations should not be allowed to dictate the content of the
media, why should minority shareholders of nonmedia corporations be allowed to dictate the political actions of the corporation?53 Second, the Court asserted that any abuse of corporate
spending may be corrected through the procedures of corporate democracy, where shareholders can remove the directors and elect
new ones.54

47 See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990).
48 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356. This idea of thinking for oneself and allowing all

messages regardless of truth or the time of day has been promoted by the “marketplace of
ideas” concept. See Jedidiah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment
and Class Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 2164 (2018).
49 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 658.
50 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (arguing that independent expenditures, political spending on behalf of but without coordination from a campaign, do not give rise to the
same sense of obligation on the candidate to favor the corporation’s interests once in office);
but see, ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF
BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 232 (2014) (criticizing this unreasonable narrowing of the definition of corruption).
51 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 673 (Brennan, J., concurring).
52 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361-62.
53 See id. at 361.
54 See id at 361-62.
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B. The State of Democracy in a Post-Citizens United World
Following Citizens United, corporations can spend virtually unlimited money from their general treasury to ensure the candidates friendliest to their interests are elected.55 Meanwhile, some
of these same corporations could pay little to no taxes, as their
workers struggle to get by.56 Even the tax cuts of 201757—which
saved corporations hundreds of billions of dollars and had been
justified by the promise that the savings would be reinvested in
workers—merely enriched the already well-off through stock buybacks.58 The resulting sense of unfairness distresses working-class
voters.59
Uncoincidentally, the United States has historically suffered
from relatively low voter turnout.60 Moreover, voter participation
55 See David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social
Responsibility after Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1205–06 (2011) (describing corporate influence in the context of “regulatory capture,” where regulatory bodies end up being influenced by the very corporations they were designed to rein in). Many corporations
funnel their political spending through super PACs, outside groups aligned with the values
of the corporation, in order to advance their political interest. See Corporate Contributions
to Outside Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside-spending/corporate-contributions?cycle=2018 (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
56 See Stephanie Saul & Patricia Cohen, Profitable Giants Like Amazon Pay $0 in Corporate Taxes. Some Voters Are Sick of It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/democrats-taxes-2020.html (Sixty of the Fortune 500 companies, including Amazon, paid $0 in federal income tax on $79 billion of corporate income,
meanwhile workers at some of these zero-tax corporations are eligible for public assistance.).
57 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054.
58 See Jim Tankersley & Matt Phillips, Trump’s Tax Cut Was Supposed to Change
Corporate Behavior. Here’s What Happened, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/12/business/economy/trumps-tax-cut-was-supposed-to-change-corporate-behavior-heres-what-happened.html (Payouts to shareholders were projected to have
increased twenty-eight percent from 2017 to 2018, up to a total of $1.3 trillion in the form
of dividends and buybacks.); The JUST Capital Rankings on Corporate Tax Reform, JUST
CAP., https://justcapital.com/reports/the-just-capital-rankings-on-corporate-tax-reform/
(last updated December 10, 2018) (Only six percent of the 2018 corporate tax windfall
went to workers, half of which took the form of a one-time bonus, while fifty-six percent of
the windfall was allocated to shareholders.).
59 See Saul & Cohen, supra note 56 (reporting on interviews with workers in Akron,
Ohio, disturbed by the disparate tax treatment between profitable corporations and themselves); FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 3 (describing the increasing gap between workers’ expectations of democratic agency and their voiceless experience at work).
60 See Drew DeSilver, In Past Elections, U.S. Trailed Most Developed Countries in
Voter Turnout, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/11/03/in-past-elections-u-s-trailed-most-developed-countries-in-voter-turnout/
(55.7% of the voting-age population participated in the 2016 general election, ranking the
United States among the bottom of peer countries.). Although the 2020 general election
boasted the highest voter turnout since 1900, with an estimate of over sixty-five percent of
the voting-age population participating, the United States’ record-high turnout still falls
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is positively correlated with income: the poorer a person is, the less
likely they are to vote.61 For instance, in presidential elections
from 1945 to 2016, voter turnout of the top half of income earners
in the United States ranged from twelve to twenty times higher
than the turnout of the bottom half of income earners.62
Studies have shown that increased economic inequality severely
depresses political engagement and interest among all but the
most affluent citizens.63 One explanation of the relationship between inequality and democratic participation is that economic inequality enhances the relative political power of the rich, who in
turn set the rules of debate, thereby stunting the range of political
ideas available to the public.64 This limited set of politically “feasible” ideas comes at the cost of pursuing redistributive measures,
which may be of particular interest to working-class citizens.65
Since Citizens United’s effect was to further increase the relative
political power of the shareholders and directors who control corporations—predominately white affluent citizens66—it follows
that the most likely outcome of the decision is the continued depression of democratic engagement among working people.67
Discouraged from democratic participation in the political
arena, yet imbued with democratic ideals and a desire for fairness,
corporate workers also face a “cognitive dissonance” in their jobs,
where they are excluded from the decision-making process.68 The
behind many of its peers. See James Palmer & Audrey Wilson, Historic U.S. Turnout Still
Lags Behind Major Democracies, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 3, 2020, 8:51 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/03/historic-united-states-voter-turnout-2020-election-behind-other-democracies-global/.
61 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL AND IDEOLOGY 741 fig.14.8 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2020) (showing the percentage difference of turnout among the top fifty percent of
income earners and the bottom fifty percent since 1945); Randall Akee, Voting and Income,
ECONOFACT (Feb. 7, 2019), https://econofact.org/voting-and-income (showing less than half
of families in the lowest income category participated in the 2016 election while over eighty
percent of families annually earning more than $150,000 voted).
62 See PIKETTY, supra note 61, at 741 fig.14.8.
63 See Frederick Solt, Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement, 52
AM. J. POL. SCI. 48 (2008); Michael Ritter & Frederick Solt, Economic Inequality and Campaign Participation, 100 SOC. SCI. Q. 678 (2019) (finding that where inequality is higher,
participation in political campaigns is lower across incomes).
64 See Solt, supra note 63, at 57.
65 See id.
66 See Holmberg, supra note 34, at 4.
67 See FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 3 (describing the contradiction between capitalism
and democracy and asserting that the United States, as made evident in Citizens United,
has chosen more capitalism over more democracy).
68 Id.
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lack of a democratic voice becomes even more pronounced when
the political sphere, in which most workers are able to participate,
has increasingly been dominated by corporations—the same entities which deny them democratic agency in their work life.69
Thus, the resonance of the political narrative against Citizens
United lies not in legal arguments over speech, but in the story
about power in our country, increasingly concentrated at the top.70
This narrative has already built a political movement in opposition
to the defunct power structure of our system.71 But the key to the
advancement of this movement will be the articulation of the democratic crises of increased corporate political power.72 This articulation will require stretching and at times escaping our dominant
liberal paradigm of political discourse.
II. THE CRISES OF CORPORATIONS AS POLITICAL ACTORS:
ILLEGITIMACY, EXPLOITATION, AND INEQUALITY
Liberal discourse has developed a sophisticated way of describing and criticizing state domination.73 But while the “liberal lexicon” provides ample language to rail against a despotic state, this
political philosophy has failed to develop language around economic domination.74 This deficiency of language is largely due to

69 See id. at 3–4 (“People raised as citizens in a democracy aspire to have some agency
over the course of their own lives, and the past decades have shown them with aching clarity that this aspiration to agency is little more than a dream.”).
70 See K. Sabeel Rahman, Corporate Power and the Unmaking of American Democracy, AM. PROSPECT (May 16, 2018), https://prospect.org/infrastructure/corporate-powerunmaking-american-democracy/.
71 See Eichen & Nyhart, supra note 27 (“Voters are now increasingly wary of how candidates obtain their money—and from whom. The rise of No-PAC pledges, for example, has
primed voters to be skeptical of those who seek out or receive corporate-backed assistance.”).
72 See SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, DEMOCRACY & CAPITALISM: PROPERTY,
COMMUNITY, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT 162 (1987).
73 See id. at 13 (“Liberalism is in principle the inveterate enemy of the despot.”).
74 See id. at 15–16. This enlightenment-era liberal ignorance of the consequences and
illegitimacy of private power is on full display as the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasizes
restraining government power while failing to recognize the private despotic potential
wielded by massive corporations imbued with increased political power as a result of its
ruling. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 313, 347, & 361-62 (2010). But see id. at
433 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Stevens briefly mentions that the original intent of a corporate ban on political contributions in the Tillman Act was a fear of corporate
power. However, while Stevens makes the argument vehemently that “it is the
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the arbitrary partition liberal thought erects between “public” politics and “private” economics.75 “Liberal theory thus renders the
power of capital invisible: democrats cannot assail economic power
within liberal theory because they lack the tools for making such
power visible.”76
A few linguistic tools useful in exposing “the invisible hand” of
economic domination are the concepts of legitimacy, exploitation,
and inequality.77 Legitimacy is a familiar idea in liberal discourse,78 but it suffers from the same arbitrary public-private partition that hampers much of liberal discourse generally.79 Rarely,
if ever, is the authority of corporations questioned as illegitimate;
yet, if we applied the same considerations we give state governments to economic entities, there is no doubt we would find corporations to be despotic.80
Moreover, emphasis on choice and consent in liberal discourse
displaces any intellectual foundation for considering material exploitation.81 Since employees agree to the contract under which
they are employed, how could they be exploited? But this line of
shareholders, as residual claimants, who are effectively footing the bill,” he fails to articulate a need to protect workers as well. See generally id. at 475–78.
75 See BOWLES & GINTIS supra note 72, at 65-66. But see id. at 18 (“Marxian political
theory, unlike liberalism, is not hampered by incoherent partitions.”). For an argument that
corporations ought to be understood as entities that cannot be relegated to either a strictly
public or private realm, see David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political
Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139 (2013).
76 BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 72 at 65-66. While much of this Note relies at times on
a Marxist description of the problem (i.e. surplus-value and exploitation) and a democratic
socialist solution to that problem (i.e. democratizing the economy), the aim is to show how
these principles will prove to be quite persuasive and popular in the United States’ political
climate in the twenty-first century. In this sense, it is helpful to understand liberalism and
Marxism each as “systems of communication, establish[ing] rules as to how social reality
will be represented in terms of its vocabulary.” Id. at 15. Insofar as Marxian communication
advances a deepening of democracy in the economy, this Note utilizes it; insofar as a Marxian framework is “theoretically anti-democratic in the same sense that any political philosophy [is] that fails to conceptualize the threat of authoritarianism, and the centrality of
privacy and individual liberty to human emancipation,” this Note seeks to maintain the
liberal scaffolding. Id. at 20.
77 See generally id. at 15–16 (“In short, [Marxism and Liberalism] are discourses whose
most fundamental orientation concerning structure and action in social life are revealed by
the customary usage of key terms.”); see also C. DOUGLAS LUMMIS, RADICAL DEMOCRACY
18–19 (1996) (explaining the concept of “legitimacy”).
78 See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, EQUALITY AND LEGITIMACY 27 (2008) (“There is an important strand in liberal thinking that links legitimacy with the consent of the governed.”).
79 See BOWLES & GINTIS supra note 72 at 65 (“Liberal political theory, which deals with
power, does not deal with the economy, while liberal economic theory ignores politics.”).
80 See FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining how the original Greek and Aristotelian definition of despotism is applicable to modern business corporations).
81 BOWLES & GINTIS supra note 72, at 15–16.
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thought ignores the coercive circumstances workers find themselves in when entering employment contracts, where the alternative to gainful employment is the deprivation of material needs.82
Furthermore, focusing on individuals and their nominal political equality prevents a reckoning with the massive social and economic inequality eroding our society.83 One ought to recall what
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said about equality near the end of his
life as he led the Poor People’s Campaign: “Now our struggle is for
genuine equality, which means economic equality. For we know
that it isn’t enough to integrate lunch counters. What does it profit
a man to be able to eat at an integrated lunch counter if he doesn’t
have enough money to buy a hamburger and a cup of coffee?”84
Thus, examining illegitimacy, exploitation, and inequality beyond what liberalism has been able to offer is necessary to demystify “the most powerful form of collective organization in contemporary capitalism—the modern business corporation . . . .”85
A. Illegitimacy: On Whose Behalf May the Corporation Speak?
An uncritical assertion that corporations should be granted constitutional rights as legal persons fails to acknowledge the democratic legitimacy those rights should entail. The corporation is a
legally constructed entity made up of various internal stakeholders (investors, directors, managers, and workers), the actions of
whom have serious consequences in the lives of external stakeholders (neighbors, families, municipalities, and the environment).86 Thus, conceptualizing, as dominant jurisprudence has,
82 See G. A. Cohen, Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlin: How Patterns Preserve Liberty,
in JOHN ARTHUR & WILLIAM H. SHAW, JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION at 250–60
(1978) (demonstrating the coercive nature of an unequal society by refuting Robert Nozick’s
defense of a libertarian society).
83 See LUMMIS, supra note 77, at 18–19 (“Liberal democrats argue that there is nothing
undemocratic about a big economic gap between rich and poor so long as it is guided by fair
rules: equal opportunity, elections, certain guaranteed legal rights, and so forth. But wiser
theorists have taught us that extreme economic inequality is not compatible with democracy.”).
84 Martin Luther King, Jr., Address before American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Memphis, Tennessee, (Mar. 18, 1968), in MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., “ALL LABOR HAS DIGNITY” 378, 388 (Michael K. Honey, ed., 2011)
(ebook).
85 BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 72, at 16.
86 See Lenore Palladino, Who Owns Corporations?, 11 BOS. REV. F. 124, 126–27 (2019).
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the corporation as an individual is both logically fallacious and realistically absurd. The corporation is best considered a public company, or, better yet, the public’s company.87 Few “individuals” exert as much control as corporations over the lives of everyday
citizens.88 Yet, in spite of the corporation’s hyper-communality,
the decisions of a corporation are governed by a limited group of
people, motivated by an even more limited set of concerns, namely
profit.89 The lack of representation on the decision-making body of
constituencies that comprise a corporate-community raises the
question of whether corporations, as currently construed, are illegitimate political actors.90
One constituency of a corporation completely ignored by the
Court in Citizens United is the labor force.91 This lack of concern
for workers in Citizens United reveals a serious issue as to a corporation’s legitimacy to “speak” politically.92 The ability to speak,
and be heard when speaking, is a form of power. Thus, it is important to recognize that Citizens United did not merely grant
speech rights, but ultimately distributed power to corporations.93
It is worth acknowledging here recent criticism of the confusion between the corporation
and the firm. See FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 95–98. Ferreras introduces the critique of
Reductio ad Corporationem, the idea that the corporation, as the legal structure created to
facilitate capital investments, has been confused with and has erased the idea of the firm,
where both labor and capital combine to accomplish some human endeavor. Id. While acknowledging the importance and utility of this distinction for developing a “political theory
of the firm,” this Note continues to conflate the corporation with the firm. This is because
U.S. legal treatment of corporations has rather uncritically treated these concepts mostly
the same (or has not acknowledged the firm aspect of corporations). In attempting to highlight the labor factor ignored in the treatment of corporations as political actors, this Note
deliberately uses the term corporation with the intent of including the labor side of the firm
in this term.
87 See KELLY, supra note 32, at 145 (“The corporation is a human community, and like
the larger community of which it is a part, it is best governed democratically.”).
88 See id. at xi (“This massive concentration gives the wealthy virtual sovereignty over
both our economic and political systems.”).
89 See JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY 166 (2003) (pointing out how no corporate constituency other than shareholders has a say in the decisions made by corporations).
90 See KELLY, supra note 32, at 72.
91 While the majority opinion fails to give workers even fleeting attention, Justice Stevens mentions employees in a brief aside along with customers as those who have no input
on what the corporation may say politically. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 467
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides? 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010). While Bebchuk and Jackson putatively seek to address this question, the authors give no consideration to the interests of workers and instead explore the divergent interests of management and shareholders. See id. at 90.
93 See andré d. p. cummings, Steven A. Ramirez, & Cheryl L. Wade, Toward a Critical
Corporate Law Pedagogy and Scholarship, 92 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 397, 407–18 (2014)
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The very key to claiming Citizens United harms democracy is in
exposing its lopsided distribution of speaking power and the illegitimacy of that power.94 Citizens United gave substantial political
power to corporations whose governing structure forsakes the input, let alone consent, of one of its most important constituencies.95
Legitimacy, however, is a keystone of Western democracy.96
Since a government acts on behalf of its citizens, democratically
legitimate governments must adhere to a process by which those
citizens voice their preferences.97 When people are denied access
to these political procedures, the sovereign body is being undemocratic and therefore acting illegitimately.98
If the reader will allow for some indulgence in American Revolutionary folklore for analogy, let us consider the Boston Tea Party
in terms of the United States’ tradition of intolerance for illegitimate governance.99 The colonial era qualm with British rule was

(“[Citizens United] represents a massive transfer of political power from ordinary citizens
to the CEOs of the most colossal capital aggregations in the history of the world.”).
94 See KELLY, supra note 32, at 72 (quoting FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, END OF HISTORY AND
THE LAST MAN 15 (Freedom Press 1st ed. 2006) (1992)) (“All regimes capable of effective
action must be based on some principle of legitimacy.”).
95 See Isabelle Ferreras, Lumping Workers in with Other Stakeholders Obscures Reality, BOS. REV. (Oct. 2, 2019), http://bostonreview.net/forum/american-corporation-crisis%E2%80%94lets-rethink-it/isabelle-ferreras-shareholders-versus-stakeholders (arguing
that workers are “labor investors” and should have equal control as capital-investors in
corporations).
96 See KELLY, supra note 32, at 113 (comparing the denunciation of legitimacy claimed
by shareholders’ “wealth privilege” to John Locke’s discrediting the legitimacy claimed by
royalty’s “monarchical privilege”); FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 122 (explaining how the
English Revolution’s resulting bicameral representative system—the House of Lords and
the House of Commons—was conditioned on democratic legitimacy via a class compromise
between the landed aristocracy and the property-less commoners). Democratic legitimacy
has even played an important role regarding whether a political community is “recognized”
as a state at the international level. See Sean D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the
Recognition of States and Governments, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 545, 580 (1999).
97 See RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? 97 (2006) (“A legitimate government must treat all those over whom it claims dominion not just with a measure of
concern but with equal concern.”) (emphasis in original); see also SADURSKI, supra note 78,
at 42-43 (discussing how majority rule as a core feature of democratic procedure must be
conditioned upon the political equality of all citizens).
98 See KELLY, supra note 32, at 84 (comparing the evolution of political sovereignty
from monarchies to truly universal suffrage, to the stunted development of economic sovereignty which has remained in the hands of stockholders—a financial aristocracy).
99 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax
Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 861 (2002). For the British
equivalent, see FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 123 (describing the establishment of the House
of Commons and the House of Lords as William of Orange’s attempt to reconcile two legitimate claims for governing power: the people and the land).
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popularized in the phrase “no taxation without representation.”100
In the Founders’ minds, the colonies’ lack of political representation in British Parliament meant they did not consent to the taxes
being levied against them.101 England, nevertheless, imposed
these taxes, fueling the Founders’ charge that the British Crown
was an illegitimate sovereign and inciting the revolutionary rage
that led to tea being dumped into the Boston Harbor.102
Likewise, today’s workers are generating value for corporations
without being represented in the decision-making process of the
corporation.103 Since the Supreme Court distributed substantial
political speaking power to corporations, the arbitrary division of
political and economic realms upheld by liberal theory has started
to crumble under the reality of Citizens United’s consequences.104
That which is economic can no longer pretend to be apolitical.105
Yet the Court fails to even investigate the definition of a corporation, let alone whether the corporation’s speaking power is legitimate.106
The Court’s silence regarding a corporation’s legitimacy, though
reflective of mainstream corporate theory today, ignores a public
debate regarding the legitimacy of these legal entities that occurred in an earlier period of the country’s history.107 The rise of
the corporate instrument shifted public policy focus on legitimate
public government power to the legitimacy of the (increasingly less

100 Grant Dorfman, The Founders’ Legal Case: No Taxation without Representation versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008).
101 See id. at 1401.
102 See Kornhauser, supra note 99, at 840. Perhaps the modern equivalent to the dramatic outrage of the Boston Tea Party would be workers hurling cushioned rolling chairs
out of the windows of a corporate boardroom.
103 See KELLY, supra note 32, at 153 (quoting democratic theorist Robert Dahl, “laws
cannot rightfully be imposed on others by persons who are not themselves obliged to obey
those laws.”).
104 See FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 161.
105 See id. at 161 (“The unsteady balance once achieved by our capitalist democracies,
in which democracy was assigned to the political arena and capitalism to the economy –
cannot be sustained much longer.”).
106 Justice Stevens briefly raises this question in the dissent, “It is an interesting question ‘who’ is even speaking when a business corporation places an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 467 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens argues that neither consumers, employees, nor shareholders, could be said to be speaking since these constituents are removed from the day-to-day
decision making. Id.
107 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 59 (1970).
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private) affairs of these business enterprises.108 James Willard
Hurst, who traced the history and development of public sentiment of corporate legitimacy, argues that the legitimacy of powerful institutions is directly related to the institution’s social utility
and social responsibility.109 The social utility of an institution establishes its legitimacy by the degree to which the public recognizes the institution as useful to an end other than its own conservation.110 Legitimacy conferred via responsibility requires that a
powerful institution be “accountable to some judgement other than
that of the power holders.”111
Thus, from the 1880s to 1930s, the desire for economic growth
legitimized the corporate form through its utility, and, in the
minds of lawmakers, even justified limiting the government’s ability to intervene in the corporation’s affairs.112 The other avenue of
legitimacy—responsibility—remained subordinated to corporate
utility until the 1920s; and over the twentieth century the legislative means of enhancing the responsibility of corporations was abdicated to two self-regulating concepts for holding corporate power
accountable: the market and individual self-interest.113 But this
imagined balance of legitimacy imposed by the market has failed
to hold.
Today, under mainstream corporate law theory, shareholders
give the corporation authority to speak through its elected board
of directors.114 And, according to shareholder primacy theorists,
the most important purpose of a corporation is to maximize profits
for its shareholders.115 Thus, under the concept of shareholder primacy, corporations have the “legitimacy” to exercise their political
speaking-power because they are loosely governed by their shareholders.116 Upon a critical look, however, this legitimacy begins to
unravel, just as the Founding Fathers’ flawed idea of legitimacy
was limited to the “universality” of white male land-owner
108
109
110
111
112
113

See id. at 59–60.
See id. at 58.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 62.
See id. at 75-76, 82-83 (the idea being that external pressures of the market and the
self-interest of profit-maximizing shareholders would keep corporate power in check).
114 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 54.
115 See Palladino, supra note 86, at 124.
116 See HURST, supra note 107, at 58; Palladino, supra note 86, at 128.
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suffrage.117 Why should society accept shareholders as the only
necessary stakeholder whose input authorizes and legitimizes corporations to speak politically?118
Thus, the Supreme Court, by unfettering corporations’ ability to
exercise political speaking power, failed to address the illegitimacy
of such speech under current corporate law.119 High time has come
to recognize the need for corporations to become democratically legitimate institutions. Along with this recognition, a better understanding of how workers give rise to the corporation’s ability to
speak is essential.
B. Exploitation: Who Generated the Speaking Power?
Workers are the key to a corporation’s ability to turn a profit.120
When that same profit can be used to advocate for policies and political candidates detrimental to these workers’ interests, there is
a democratic crisis of exploitation.121 The way to resolve the issue
is not by taking away the speaking power of corporations but by
democratizing their governance.122
The concept of exploitation is mostly foreign in liberal discourse
due to an emphasis on consent,123 but “material exploitation . . . is
a matter of arithmetic, not of conviction[.]”124 This “arithmetic” of

117 See KELLY, supra note 32, at 84 (explaining how “[t]he growth of democracy” went
“from the king, to the aristocracy to propertied white males, to unpropertied white makes,
to black males, and finally to women”).
118 See id. at 84-85 (arguing that just as political sovereignty has been extended beyond
the propertied class, economic sovereignty ought to extend beyond the wealthy, citing that
“[t]he wealthiest [ten] percent of households” holds a majority of corporate stock and “thus
have more vot[ing]” power).
119 See FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 3 (discussing how the “Supreme Court’s Citizens
United ruling declared that corporations are to be considered . . . people with the right to
free speech[,]” thus the Supreme Court “cho[se] more capitalist despotism and less democracy”); see also, generally, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
120 See WOLFF, supra note 20, at 79.
121 See id. at 94; FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 13.
122 See Greenfield, supra note 19.
123 Though liberalism does reject an individual’s ability to “consent” to slave labor, its
use of consent as a way to obscure the coercive relationship between workers and their
employers is an “oversimplification.” David Ellerman, The Case for Workplace Democracy,
in COUNCIL DEMOCRACY: TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST POLITICS 210–11 (2018).
124 BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 72, at 15-16.
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exploitation is important for developing an argument for workers’
rights to their workplace. A dive into Marxian political economics
will help articulate this concept.
Material exploitation concerns the concept of surplus-value125—
the additional value, or profit, created at the end of the production
process.126 By observing the totality of the production process, or
the circulation of capital, Karl Marx points out a peculiarity with
the final result.127 If, in typical market conditions, exchanges are
made for equivalent values, where does the capitalist’s profit come
from?128 After debunking a few of the notions liberal economic theory upholds as the source of this surplus-value (like buying low
and selling high)129 Marx explains that, in reality, surplus-value
is derived from the exploitation of human labor.130
To illustrate, when setting out a business endeavor, the capitalist uses money to buy or rent all the necessary machinery, materials, space, and labor to create a commodity.131 At the end of the
business process, should not the value of the commodity simply
equal the cost of all its inputs?132 Yet at the end of the process,
after paying for all the costs of production and after the capitalist
sells the commodities, realizing their value, the capitalist winds
up with more money than they started with.133
Marx then points out that labor is the one factor of production
which costs less to the capitalist than the value it produces.134 If
workers were wholly compensated for the corresponding value
they produced, then there would be no profit at the end of the
125 See DAVID HARVEY, A COMPANION TO MARX’S CAPITAL 122–25 (2010).
126 See KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, VOLUME ONE 251

(Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Books 1990) (1867).
127 See HARVEY, supra note 125, at 92.
128 See id. at 93.
129 MARX, supra note 126, at 260–69. Though occasional exchanges by merchants do
“parasitically” turn a quick profit this way, cleverly navigating prices cannot account for
widespread surplus-value generation. Id. at 264–67. Marx notes, “The capitalist class . . .
taken as a whole, cannot defraud itself.” Id. at 266.
130 Id. at 270. Labor, as a “special commodity” which the capitalist must purchase to
produce something, has the unique quality of creating more value than it cost to purchase.
Id.
131 See id. at 291.
132 See id. at 262; HARVEY, supra note 125, at 122.
133 See MARX, supra note 126, at 269. Marx sarcastically likens this result to larva
transforming into butterflies—miraculously! Id. This process of exchange is labeled M-CM’—Money for Commodity (or bundle of commodities) for more Money—where “M’=M+∆M,
i.e. the original sum advanced [for production] plus an increment [or profit].” Id. at 251.
134 See id. at 270; HARVEY, supra note 125, at 102.
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process.135 So, workers produce enough value during their working
day to cover the cost of their own wages, but, crucially, workers
continue to labor beyond that moment, creating surplus-value.136
Thus, it is human skill, creativity, and ingenuity, that add value
to the commodity during the production process, and by compensating that human input at a rate less than the value of its output,
the capitalist is able to sell the commodity for more than its purchasing price.137 And so, upon sale of the commodity at that higher
price, the surplus-value is realized.138
The question is, after workers have produced enough value to
pay for their own wages, what happens to the additional surplusvalue they produce? The answer is that the owner of the enterprise and its inputs appropriates the surplus-value and decides
whether to reinvest or keep the profits.139 It is in this way that
workers are exploited, not necessarily through a system of abuse
or violence, but simply by the rules of the capitalist economy.140
And so, corporations are only able to make a profit when they
generate surplus-value, beyond the cost of production (including
employees’ wages).141 This value is generated in large part by the
labor force.142 To then use the surplus created by workers for political purposes, all the while preventing those very workers—the
source of the surplus—from having any say on which political
135 See HARVEY, supra note 125, at 124–25 (explaining that surplus-value is created
“by milking the gap between what labor gets and the value that labor makes.”).
136 See MARX, supra note 126, 324–25. Marx calls the amount of labor needed each day
to reproduce the laborer’s cost “necessary labour” and calls the amount of time worked beyond that point each day “surplus labour.” Id.
137 See id. at 283; HARVEY, supra note 125, at 132–33.
138 See MARX, supra note 126, at 293.
139 See WOLFF, supra note 20, at 105.
140 See id. at 103–06. Wolff describes the “surplus-analysis” as the key differentiator
between a capitalist political economy and a socialist one. Whereas the surplus, or profits,
in a capitalist system are appropriated and controlled by a minority class of capitalists, a
socialist system is one in which the workers themselves appropriate and distribute the
surplus of their own labor. Id. at 105. This explanation of the difference between capitalism and socialism necessarily differs from the mainstream conception of private versus
public (or government) ownership of the means of production. See Ilya Somin, Perils of
“Democratic Socialism”, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 5, 2019, 8:15 PM),
https://reason.com/2019/06/05/perils-of-democratic-socialism-2/. If a government appropriates and distributes surplus in an undemocratic way (without the direct input of the
workers who generated it), as many historical examples of countries who called themselves “socialist” have, Wolff argues these economies are merely state-capitalist nations,
as opposed to private-capitalist nations like the United States. WOLFF, supra note 20, at
106-07.
141 See HARVEY, supra note 125, at 123–24.
142 See Palladino, supra note 86, at 126-27.
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causes the surplus will be spent is unfair and inherently anti-democratic, making worker exploitation even more apparent.143 However, increased worker ownership and control of corporations
would mitigate the twofold quandary of exploitation: (1) appropriation—being “deprived of the fruits of one’s labor,”144 and (2) distribution—the lack of control as to where the corporate surplusvalue shall go.145
As generators of a corporation’s speaking power, workers ought
to be given a say as to how that speech power is used. But when
human labor is viewed merely as a production cost that must be
reduced in order to maximize shareholder wealth, the political influence derived from workers is likely to be spent advancing shareholders’, as opposed to workers’, interests on issues such as wages,
union rights, maximum hours, overtime pay, and other benefits.146
The idea is simple: it is unfair to bankroll political issues with
money generated by another person without the consent of that
person.147 This is particularly obvious when the political ideas being promoted are against that person’s interest.148 And so, understanding exploitation and its product, inequality, as social harms
in need of remedy gives credence to expanding the democratic
power of workers. Yet, as economic inequality continues to rise,
particularly along racial and gender lines, the hope of democratic
power for workers becomes fainter.
143
144
145
146

See WOLFF, supra note 20, at 94.
BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 72, at 16.
See WOLFF, supra note 20, at 11–12.
See id. at 94 (arguing that the disparity of resources available for political contributions between workers and capital results in a political system highly attuned to the
needs of the latter over the former). See, e.g., Sara Nelson, Amazon’s Battle in Seattle Is a
Fight Against Worker Power, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 28, 2019), https://prospect.org/power/amazons-battle-in-seattle-is-a-fight-against-worker-power/ (explaining
how working-class victories like the $15 minimum wage in certain cities have invigorated
corporate political spending against such efforts).
147 Some may argue that the employee contract is a form of consent to the political
spending of the employer since the employee alienates their right to the product of their
labor and its value. See KELLY, supra note 32, at 69–72. The prevalence of this argument
necessitates a Marxian analysis for understanding surplus-value and exploitation. But
even without a Marxist analysis, the leverage and relative bargaining power of the average
corporation against the average worker reveals that non-union workers have little ability
to negotiate for a fair contract, and the use of the value added by the employee to advocate
for politicians and policies that are detrimental to the employee must be seen as an agreement reached against the coercive alternatives to acceptance for the worker (i.e. unemployment, poverty, eviction, lack of health insurance, etc.). See Cohen, supra note 82, at 257–
60.
148 See Nelson, supra note 146 (describing corporate political spending in opposition to
pro-worker initiatives like an increased minimum wage).
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C. Inequality: The Upward Spiral of Wealthy White Male Hegemony
Inequality is practically baked into the corporate structure in
the United States,149 and it is reaching unprecedented levels.150
The distribution of political speaking power to corporate boards
and managers perpetuates these massive levels of inequality.151
For instance, the average CEO-to-worker compensation ratio is
over 300-to-1.152 Regarding inequality in the ownership of corporate equity, over eighty-six percent of business equity is owned by
the top ten percent of households, while the bottom half of households own less than one percent of such equity.153 Moreover, racial
and gender inequality remains prevalent among the power-holders of corporations.154
Concomitant with the economic inequality accelerated by the
corporate squeeze for surplus-value, gender, and race inequality
are entrenched by the current corporate governance structure.155
149 See PIKETTY, supra note 25, at 1 (“When the rate of return on capital exceeds the
rate of growth of output and income . . . capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and
unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based.”).
150 See Taylor Telford, Income Inequality in America is the Highest it’s Been Since Census Bureau Started Tracking it, Data Shows, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2019, 3:57 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/09/26/income-inequality-america-highestits-been-since-census-started-tracking-it-data-show/ (reporting on a rise in the Gini index
which measures wealth inequality on a scale from zero, representing a society where every
household has the same wealth as every other household, to one, where all wealth is held
by one household to the exclusion of all others). When income inequality in the U.S. began
being measured, the Gini index was 0.40. In 2018, the index had reached 0.49. Id. For context, no European country had an index higher than 0.38 in 2018. Id.
151 See Greenfield, supra note 19.
152 See Lawrence Mishel & Jessica Schieder, CEO Compensation Surged in 2017,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensationsurged-in-2017/.
153 See Palladino, supra note 86, at 136; FEDERAL RESERVE, DISTRIBUTIONAL
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS, Distribution of Household Wealth in the United States Since 1989,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/chart/ (select “Corporate
equities and mutual funds share” in Select Wealth Component dropdown; then mark
Units as “Shares (%)”) (last updated Dec. 18, 2020).
154 See cummings, Ramirez, & Wade, supra note 93, at 407–17 (discussing the prevalence of white male supremacy in corporations). According to a 2018 survey, women of color
hold only 4.6% of corporate board seats in Fortune 500 companies while white men hold
sixty-six percent of board seats. See ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES: THE
2018 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 5, 17
(Jan. 16, 2019) (finding that although diversity on corporate boards has been increasing,
progress is slow).
155 See cummings, Ramirez, & Wade, supra note 93, at 407–17 (regarding the lack of
pedagogy on white male supremacy in corporations).
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The concept of shareholder primacy, “one of the key drivers of inequality in our economy,” was fiercely advanced by Milton Friedman at a particular historical moment in the United States.156
Friedman published Capitalism and Freedom in 1962,157 amidst
the emerging Black freedom struggle for civil rights, which by the
end of the decade, dovetailed with the radical labor movement.158
Friedman anchored (whether or not consciously159) the hegemony
of white male elites by arguing that shareholders, disproportionately represented by that demographic, and their interests are to
be the ultimate concern of corporations above any other corporate
constituency.160 In this way, the economic inequality advanced by
shareholder primacy worsens gender and race inequities.161
Identifying who currently owns corporate equity in this country
and how their ownership relates to surging inequality reveals the
devastating consequences of the shareholder primacy philosophy.162 The prevalent use of stock options for upper-level and CSuite managers has transferred enormous wealth generated by
corporations to those in already highly lucrative positions.163
Moreover, “broad stock ownership across American society is a
myth.”164 The top tier of income earners own most of the corporate
equity in the United States, thus increasing share value disproportionately benefits the wealthiest upper centile of households,
driving unprecedented levels of inequality.165 This arrangement of

156 See Lauren Jacobs, The Racist Lie of “Takers and Makers”, BOS. REV. (Oct. 2, 2019),
http://bostonreview.net/forum/american-corporation-crisis%E2%80%94lets-rethink-it/lauren-jacobs-racist-lie-%E2%80%9Ctakers-and-makers%E2%80%9D.
157 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
158 See Palladino, supra note 86, at 124; Jacobs, supra note 156. For a history of the
culmination of these two political movements in the late 1960s; see generally MICHAEL K.
HONEY, SOUTHERN LABOR AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS: ORGANIZING MEMPHIS WORKERS
(1993).
159 See John Jackson, Milton Friedman’s Economic Racism, EVONOMICS (June 23,
2019), https://evonomics.com/milton-friedmans-economic-racism/.
160 See Jacobs, supra note 156.
161 See id.
162 See Holmberg, supra note 34, at 5.
163 See PIKETTY, supra note 25, at 378–81 (explaining how the rise of “supermanagers,”
CEOs with “skyrocketing pay packages,” including stock options, accounts, in part, for the
soaring wealth and income inequality in the United States).
164 Holmberg, supra note 34, at 8–9 (“Less than [fourteen percent] of households in the
United States own corporate stock directly.”).
165 See Holmberg, supra note 34, at 8; see also Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, &
Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United
States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553, 598 (2018) (explaining that the upward spiraling of wealth
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share ownership also contributes to the racial wealth gap since
white households are more likely to own corporate stock than
Black and Latinx households.166 This upward spiral of inequality
along the intersecting lines of class, race, and gender will continue
unless the corporate structure is radically reconfigured to be more
democratic.
III. THE SOLUTION: WORKER DEMOCRACY IN CORPORATIONS
The three problems exacerbated by Citizens United—illegitimacy, exploitation, and inequality—can be mitigated through reforming corporations to be more democratic.167 Specifically, such
reforms should mandate worker share ownership and increased
worker control on corporate boards.168 These reforms (1) will counter the anti-democratic tendencies promoted by Citizens United—
illegitimacy, exploitation, and inequality—and (2) are politically
viable, salient, and mobilizing.169
inequality “leads to an increase in capital income concentration, which itself reinforces
wealth inequality as top capital incomes are saved at a high rate”).
166 See Holmberg, supra note 34, at 9 (“While [sixty] percent of white households have
retirement accounts and/or own some stock, only [thirty-four] percent of black households
and [thirty] percent of Latinx households do . . . .”).
167 This Note’s analysis is largely missing consideration of other “external” stakeholders of corporations, such as consumers, communities, and the environment, and instead
focuses on deepening democracy for a neglected internal stakeholder—the worker. See
KELLY, supra note 32, at 150 (“All stakeholders do indeed deserve consideration. But that
doesn’t mean all deserve internal standing.”). Although the political power of corporations
has sometimes dire consequences for external constituents, it is beyond the scope of this
Note to articulate reforms that address these concerns. But, for an analysis arguing for
additional constituents, see Greenfield, supra note 19. For a justification of this limited
focus on workers, see KELLY, supra note 32, at 149–50 (arguing that external stakeholders
may be better protected via government regulation imposed on corporations from the outside, while democratic reforms for workers can be achieved through reforms to corporate
governance laws).
168 See Palladino, supra note 86, at 126-27; Ferreras, supra note 95.
169 Corporations are incorporated in the state of their choice and are thereafter governed by the corporate laws of that state. See Palladino, supra note 86, at 133-34. The state
in which most corporations (six out of every ten) are incorporated is Delaware. See KENT
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 2 (2006). Implementing the following reforms to corporate law would likely necessitate requiring federal charterships, since enacting worker-friendly reforms which shareholders oppose in any one state would merely drive
corporations to seek a chartership in a different state with its preferred corporate laws.
This results in a classic federalism problem of a “race to the bottom” among the states, who
compete for corporate charterships by catering to shareholders, often at the expense of other
stakeholders—although shareholder primacists actually find this feature of corporate law
to be a “race to the top.” See Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware
in Corporate Law, 67 DUKE J. L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 135-45 (2004).
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A. Worker Ownership Funds
One effective way to mitigate the illegitimate, exploitative, and
unequal relationship between owners of capital and those who
must sell their labor to survive would be to require corporations to
create an ownership fund specifically for workers.170 The fund
could be created by diluting the existing shareholders’ ownership
of a corporation, incrementally siphoning a percentage of corporate equity into a collective trust held for workers.171 One policy
proposal offered by Senator Bernie Sanders during his 2020 presidential bid would add two percent of corporate equity to the
Worker Ownership Fund each year for ten years until workers controlled twenty percent of their corporation’s equity.172 A policy analyst explained that this proposal would “shift at least $7.1 trillion
of corporate equity,” of the $35.6 trillion currently existing in the
U.S., “into worker funds by gradually diluting the value of previously-issued corporate stock.”173
These Worker Ownership Funds would create both “distributional and control rights,” meaning workers would be rewarded
with a share of the corporate surplus and be able to exercise the
voting and other decision-making rights of shareholders.174 Crucially, unlike typical shareholder investments, individual employees would not be able to transfer or alienate their portion of corporate equity.175 Thus, the benefits and control of the workerownership fund would remain with the current employees of the
corporation in perpetuity,176 so as not to wind up back in the hands
of capitalists.177
170 See Matthew Lawrence, Owning the Future, INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. (Jan. 19,
2018), https://www.ippr.org/blog/owning-the-future.
171 See Palladino, supra note 86, at 135-36.
172 Corporate Accountability and Democracy, BERNIESANDERS.COM: ISSUES,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy/ (last visited
Dec. 4, 2020).
173 Matt Bruenig, Bernie Wants You to Own More of the Means of Production,
JACOBIN (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/10/bernie-wants-you-to-ownmore-of-the-means-of-production.
174 Lawrence, supra note 170.
175 See Palladino, supra note 86, at 137.
176 See id.
177 See MATTHEW LAWRENCE ET AL., CO-OPERATIVES UNLEASHED: DOUBLING THE SIZE
OF THE UK’S CO-OPERATIVE SECTOR 42 (2018) (discussing how Employee Stock Ownership
Plans (ESOPs) have often done just this due to their ability to be bought and sold).
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In measuring the effectiveness increased worker ownership and
worker control of corporations would have on legitimizing the corporation as a political actor, one should look to Hurst’s utility and
responsibility factors for legitimacy.178 Worker ownership funds
would legitimize corporations via social utility because workers
who know that increased productivity has the potential to result
in economic gains would be incentivized to work more efficiently
and productively.179 Also, granting voting rights to workers as
shareholders would legitimize corporations by making them more
accountable to workers’ interests.
The concept of exploitation entails the relationship between
workers and the value they produce.180 Currently, shareholders,
as residual claimants, expect to be the primary beneficiaries of the
surplus-value generated by workers.181 So, regarding the appropriation aspect of exploitation, Worker Ownership Funds would
return to workers some of the value they produced.182 This surplus
would be redistributed to workers when dividends are granted.183
In a very real way, Worker Ownership Funds grant workers a degree of ownership over the means of production.184
Worker Ownership Funds would also reduce inequality in several ways. Worker Ownership Funds would provide the ability to
build wealth for those employed in low-wage and insecure jobs at
178 HURST, supra note 107, at 58.
179 See Palladino, supra note 32 (explaining how such funds would help ensure that

“the workers who created the profits will not be left in the dust” when corporate directors
decide on actions like the distribution of dividends).
180 See WOLFF, supra note 20, at 11–12 (defining exploitation as “the production of a
surplus appropriated and distributed by those other than its producers”).
181 See Ciepley, supra note 75, at 146.
182 See Peter Gowan & Mathew Lawrence, Democratic Ownership Funds: Creating
Shared Wealth and Power, COMMON WEALTH (June 12, 2019), https://www.commonwealth.co.uk/Democratic-ownership-funds-creating-shared-wealth-and-power.html.
183 See Palladino, supra note 32 (“Granting employees an equity ‘stake and a say’ in the
companies that they work for means that when corporate executives decide on the level of
dividends to be paid to shareholders, the workers who created the profits will not be left in
the dust.”).
184 See Bruenig, supra note 173 (outlining Sen. Bernie Sanders’ plan to create Worker
Ownership Funds). Moreover, this “backend” payment of surplus-value through dividends
accounts for the variation in profit from year to year by giving workers a portion at the end
of the business process rather than issuing higher wages on the front-end, which would
require predicting the corporation’s profitability for the future term. This back-end arrangement also incentivizes productivity since workers would know their increased efficiency will
be materially rewarded. However, in crafting legislation to enact these funds, it will be
crucial to prevent corporations from simply reducing wages either to maintain a level of
profitability for shareholders’ despite their diluted ownership or by treating the workers’
dividends as a portion of their compensation.
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corporations, positions disproportionately held by people of
color.185 Encouragingly, research from Rutgers suggests that
worker ownership plans reduce the gender and racial wealth
gap.186 The study interviewed workers who participated in Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) at their jobs,187 a voluntary retirement savings program similar to Worker Ownership
Funds. The women of color interviewed for the study had accumulated much more wealth through ESOPs than their demographic’s
average nationally.188 In terms of household wealth, Latinx households with ESOPs had built almost twelve times as much wealth
as Latinx households nationally, while Black households with
ESOPs had three times as much wealth as Black households nationally.189 But while access to the Worker Ownership Fund, unlike ESOPs, would be tied to maintaining employment with the
corporation, and the primary financial benefit would come in the
form of dividend payouts rather than a stock asset that could be
bought and sold, these dividends could provide additional disposable income for working-class families to invest in other forms of
asset building.
Though the estimated payouts for Worker Ownership Funds
vary significantly across economic sectors,190 these Ownership
Funds would also grant workers the voting rights enjoyed by
shareholders.191 By owning part of the corporation, workers would
be given the ability to engage in the decision-making process in
the same way shareholders do.192 These include some of the most
important decisions affecting workers’ lives, such as “mergers and

185 INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AND PROFIT SHARING,
BUILDING THE ASSETS OF LOW AND MODERATE INCOME WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES: THE
ROLE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 21 (Mar. 2019), https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/rutgerskelloggreport_april2019.pdf (“[W]hite men are overrepresented in jobs
with the highest levels of authority, earnings, and job training while black and Latina
women are often concentrated in low-wage, low-prestige jobs that lack benefits.”) (citations
omitted); Holmberg, supra note 34, at 9.
186 See INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AND PROFIT SHARING,
SUPRA NOTE 185, at 21.
187 Id. at 2.
188 Id. at 21.
189 Id.
190 See Palladino, supra note 32 (estimating, for instance, had these funds been in place,
an Apple employee would have enjoyed $10,405 in stock payouts, while a Wal-Mart employee’s payout would have been $400).
191 See id.
192 See Palladino, supra note 86, at 139.
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acquisitions, liquidation, and electing the board of directors.”193
Those confronting the real-world consequences of the corporation’s
decisions, like losing their job, would finally have an avenue for
participating in that decision. Coupled with economic bicameralism, as outlined below, Worker Ownership Funds would redistribute a degree of control to workers, doing much to make corporations democratic political actors.194
B. Worker Decision-Making Via Economic Bicameralism
While Worker Ownership Funds would provide an avenue for
workers to participate in corporate governance, the most ambitious funds, which advocate for only twenty percent of corporate
equity, would leave workers with a minority of the voting share.195
So, giving workers more control regarding the strategic decisions
of the firm on the corporate board would give workplace democracy
more bite.196 While this control could take a number of different
forms, a structure developed by Isabelle Ferreras, which she has
termed “economic bicameralism,” presents an attractively simple
and fair way to extend democratic agency to workers.197
An economic bicameral corporate structure would mean two separate governing bodies in the corporation represent capital

193
194
195
196
197

Id.
See Lawrence, supra note 170.
See Corporate Accountability and Democracy, supra note 172.
See Ferreras, supra note 95.
See “A Reader’s Guide for Reflection and Debate about Economic Bicameralism,” in
FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 171–88. But see “Conventional Account of Why Multi-Stakeholder Governance Cannot Work” in Yosifon, supra note 55, at 1238–39 (discussing how
shareholder primacist scholars criticize an economic bicameral model because (1) board
consideration of workers’ in addition to shareholders’ interests would either paralyze the
board or allow malfeasance by claiming it was in the interest of one of the constituencies,
and (2) worker representation on corporate boards would lead to representatives seeking to
maximize the interests of their constituency at the expense of other representative’s constituencies). For a recent example of an attempt by corporate management to voluntarily
consider interests beyond the shareholders, see Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (Aug. 19, 2019), https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures1.pdf (updating its “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation” to espouse an equal consideration for and commitment to “stakeholders”: customers, employees, suppliers, and
communities, in addition to shareholders). But see Ferreras, supra note 95 (expressing serious doubt that Business Roundtable’s nice words would actually benefit the worker-corporation relationship).
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investors and labor investors respectively.198 This would meaningbifully involve workers in corporate governance.199 Economic
cameralism would make corporations accountable to two equal
representative bodies. One body—a House of Capital-Investor
Representatives—would be elected via a vote from shareholders,
just as current boards of directors are elected.200 The other body—
a Labor-Investors House of Representatives—would be elected by
and accountable to workers.201 Then the corporation would be
steered by an executive committee that would receive its direction
from decisions passed by both houses.202 Like legislative bicameralism, each house would have veto power over a decision proposed
by the other house.203 Thus, strategic, firm-wide decisions would
require buy-in from both labor and capital representatives.
Economic bicameralism would legitimize corporations by giving
the otherwise voiceless labor constituency an equal seat at the decision-making table.204 Through the bicameral system, corporations would offer the legitimizing utility of learning by providing
more responsibility to workers regarding strategic decisions of the
corporation, thereby both increasing workers’ knowledge and
awareness of corporate information and utilizing the unique
knowledge and expertise already possessed by workers.205 Corporations would also clearly be legitimized via increased responsibility in an economic bicameral system because they would become
accountable to workers’ interests.206
This increased accountability would also coincide with increased
control for workers. Workers are exploited not only by the appropriation of the profits they produce but also by their complete lack
of agency as to how those profits will be used.207 This distributional aspect of exploitation would be mitigated through a corporate structure like economic bicameralism that increases worker

198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

See FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 140–41.
See KELLY, supra note 32, at 156; see also FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 140.
FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 140–41.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 140.
See HURST, supra note 107, at 58.
Id.
See WOLFF, supra note 20, at 11–12.
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control over strategic decision-making.208 In a bicameral corporate
government, labor representatives and capital representatives
would need to reach a mutually agreeable decision regarding the
corporate surplus.209 For instance, rather than the corporate surplus going to fund, say, rivals to politicians who increased the minimum wage in a city where the company employs a lot of workers,210 management would have to satisfy both investors and
workers when determining whether or not the corporation should
participate as a political actor and what political causes it ought
to advance.
Also, as a much-needed blow to shareholder primacy, increased
worker control would fundamentally change the incentives at corporations, making corporations consider the interests of workers,
rather than seeing workers merely as a production cost that needs
to be minimized.211 Thus, workers having democratic agency regarding the use of the value they produce would displace the exploitative relationship between workers who invest their labor in
the corporation and shareholders who invest capital.212
Economic bicameralism also has the potential to reduce inequality in a number of ways. First, workers would have a say in the
compensation of top managers at the corporation.213 This is important because unprecedented levels of executive compensation
have been linked to rising economic inequality in the United
States since the 1970s.214 Workers would likely be interested in
reining in the over 300-to-1 income ratio of the average CEO to the
average worker.215
Second, those labor-board members representing labor
208 See FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 73, 75–76.
209 See id. at 130–31.
210 See Goyette, supra note 3 (describing how in 2015 Seattle became the first major

city in the country to adopt a $15 minimum wage thanks to city councilmembers whose
reelection Amazon opposed in 2019).
211 See Anne Price, Don’t Fixate on the Racial Wealth Gap: Focus on Undoing Its Root
Causes, ROOSEVELT INST. 26 (Feb. 2020) (“There are a set of enabling goods and services
that are so critical for life, liberty, and self-determination that their production and distribution should not be vulnerable to the rationing and pricing that come about from firms
trying to maximize profits for their shareholders.”); see also HARVEY, supra note 125, at
132.
212 See WOLFF, supra note 20, at 11–12.
213 See KELLY, supra note 32, at 156.
214 See PIKETTY, supra note 25, at 374–81 (explaining that the top ten percent of wealth
holders claimed a larger portion of total incomes as remuneration for upper-level management employees outpaced average wage growth).
215 See Mishel & Schieder, supra note 152, at 1, 3-4.
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investors, a much more diverse group than capital investors,
would likely accelerate increasing the gender and racial diversity
of corporate directors, which has otherwise seen snail’s-pace progress in recent years among unicameral boards elected by shareholders.216
Third, given the deficiency of democratic engagement among
working-class citizens, economic bicameralism would counter political inequality in the United States.217 By providing an avenue
for democratic participation in the workplace, those who have determined that the political process fails to represent their interests
would find their “hunger for democracy” being fulfilled in their economic lives.218
Thus, Worker Ownership Funds and Economic Bicameralism
would do much to address the democratic crises that Citizens
United unleashed. However, diminishing the illegitimacy, exploitation, and inequality of corporate political power is easier said
than done. Fortunately, the glimmer of a viable path toward enacting these vital measures has emerged in recent years, thanks
in large part to Citizens United itself.
IV. THE SMALL DOLLAR REVOLUTION: POLITICAL VIABILITY OF
CORPORATE REFORM
Intuitively, these democratizing reforms would seem doomed to
fail in a post-Citizens United political landscape. How could the
political needs of the working class be heard over the blaring
agenda of well-resourced corporations? But actually, the moment
may be ripening for radical corporate reforms as the political
winds seem to be filling the sails of democratic socialism in parts
of the United States.219
216 See ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 154, at 17 (noting that in 2018
women of color held only 4.6% of corporate board seats on Fortune 500 companies while
white men held sixty-six percent of board seats).
217 See Solt, supra note 63, at 48, 57.
218 See FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 160.
219 See, e.g., Peter Lucas, Zohran Mamdani’s New York State Assembly Victory Shows
What Winning Socialist Campaigns Can Look Like, JACOBIN (July 27, 2020), https://jacobinmag.com/2020/07/zohran-mamdani-dsa-new-york-socialism (emphasizing how Zohran
Mamdani, the victorious socialist candidate in the New York State Assembly race, refused
corporate donations while his opponent raked in corporate donations to the tune of
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Yet the ability of unaccountable corporate entities to dictate our
political system has been detrimental to democracy. Corporations
are controlled by a small portion of the general population,220 and
historically, democratic participation in our country is notably
weak when compared to other similar countries.221 Studies show
that an unequal distribution of power contributes to low political
participation.222 Disproportionately, the working class is less
likely to engage in the political process in our Country.223 Correcting this lopsided political engagement is crucial because addressing pressing issues of the twenty-first century, like climate catastrophe, will require political engagement from a larger portion of
the population.224 Meanwhile, the anti-democracy of Citizens
United is a direct impediment to that increased participation.
Highlighting Citizens United’s most unpopular anti-democratic
consequences is an effective way to engage otherwise disinterested
or disillusioned populations in the political process by appealing to
people’s “hunger for democracy.”225 Should this appeal translate
into elected legislative power, democratizing corporations is a compelling way to tackle the root issue accelerated by Citizens United:
concentrated power.226 There is an advantage to circumventing

$230,000); see also Daniel Berti, Marine Vet, Lyft Driver, Socialist: Del. Lee Cart Confounds his Critics, PRINCE WILLIAM TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.princewilliamtimes.com/news/marine-vet-lyft-driver-socialist-del-lee-carter-confounds-his-critics/article_4ecb5880-323a-11ea-8eb5-5ba353e2dcb3.html (describing how a socialist Virginia
state delegate defeated a six-term Republican incumbent in 2017 and fended off challenges from Republican and Democratic rivals to win reelection in 2019).
220 See Greenfield, supra note 19 (“[Citizens United] poses a major problem for our democracy because corporations amplify the voices of a tiny number of the financial and managerial elite—the notorious [one] percent.”).
221 See DeSilver, supra note 60.
222 See Solt, supra note 63, at 48 (conducting an empirical study across five Western
democratic countries showing that the degree of one’s political interest, the frequency of
their political discussions, and the rate of their electoral participation correlated with income inequality—the more unequal the country the less politically engaged the non-affluent were).
223 See id. at 54.
224 See Naomi Klein, Don’t Look Away Now, the Climate Crisis Needs You, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 6, 2015, 7:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/06/dontlook-away-now-the-climate-crisis-needs-you (explaining that the scope of the climate crisis
requires a global effort of massive political-economic transformation which can only be
brought about through a mandate delivered by an equally massive political movement).
225 See FERRERAS, supra note 22, at 159–60 (tracing recent global democratic uprisings
such as Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, and the Arab Spring, as manifestations of
an expectation of democratic justice).
226 If corporations were democratically controlled, there would be less of an issue with
allowing corporations to participate in our political system. See Greenfield, supra note 19;
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Citizens United in this way. Seeking to overturn the decision or
pass a constitutional amendment against corporate personhood is
a much harder political battle, implicating an attack on free
speech, and misses an opportunity to win a more compelling political argument about deepening our commitment to democracy.227
As Peter Bachrach pointed out in 1982, “[w]ithin the context of
American experience . . . our history shows that democracy, taken
seriously, disrupts the existing distribution of power.”228
The first step in taking democracy seriously is to highlight just
how anti-democratic corporate dominance of our politics is. Luckily, rejecting corporate donations and directly antagonizing corporate political influence has come to be an effective campaign strategy in recent years.229 Citizens United has played an enormous
role in popularizing corporate antagonism in the political
sphere.230 The case name itself has become synonymous with outsized corporate dominance in our politics.231 The “small-dollar revolution” has turned anti-corporate frustration into significant
power building.232 Sen. Bernie Sanders’s ultimately unsuccessful
2020 run for president proved as much by out-fundraising every
other Democratic primary candidate through grassroots donations
see also Palladino, supra note 86, at 134 (explaining a way to pass radical corporate reforms
via federal charters).
227 See Greenfield, supra note 19 (highlighting the anti-democratic nature of corporations being the heart of why Citizens United is so problematic); see also MARTIN H. REDISH,
MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 8 (2001). Redish makes compelling free speech arguments in favor of corporate political participation
but fails to reckon with the source and legitimacy of that speech. Thus, conservative arguments like Redish’s only hold water against restrictions on corporate speech but do not
address proposals for more democracy within the corporation.
228 Peter Bachrach, Class Struggle and Democracy, 2 DEMOCRACY 29, 34 (Oct. 1982).
229 See Kotch, supra note 28 (describing how candidates touted their independence from
corporate money to raise small-dollar donations in the 2018 mid-term elections).
230 See Mimi Murray Digby Marziani, Growing Backlash Against ‘Citizens United’,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/growing-backlash-against-citizens-united; see also Ian Vandewalker, The
2018 Small Donor Boom Was Drowned Out by Big Donors, Thanks to Citizens United,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/2018-small-donor-boom-was-drowned-out-big-donors-thanks-citizens-united.
Though Vandewalker sees no end in sight for the wealthy’s domination of politics, the
“small donor boom” indicates that more individuals are becoming personally invested in the
political process thanks to backlash from Citizens United. See id.
231 See Nicandro Iannaci, Six Years Later, Citizens United Still Looms Large, CONST.
DAILY (Jan. 21, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/five-years-later-citizens-unitedstill-looms-large.
232 See Eliza Newlin Carney, Campaign Finance Reforms May Never Pass, But the
Low-Dollar Revolution Has Already Begun, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 28, 2019), https://prospect.org/power/campaign-reforms-may-never-pass-low-dollar-revolution-already-begun/.
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while articulating class antagonism against corporate interests.233
Sanders rejected corporate and Super PAC donations,234 while rivals for the party’s nomination backtracked on such commitments.235
This style of politics is being replicated through “insurgent”
campaigns across the country, with considerable success.236 One
such insurgent candidate, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, won an improbable primary election against a powerful incumbent Democrat
in New York thanks, in part, to a flood of small-dollar donations
from across the country.237 Since first winning office in 2018, Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez, without any corporate-backers, has
continued to show fundraising prowess through small-dollar donations, outraising every other House Democrat in the third quarter
of 2019.238 With the unpopularity of Citizens United and its resulting corporate influence over politics, candidates who expressly reject corporate cash may continue to build momentum to achieve
political power.239

233 See Tim Dickinson, Bernie Sanders Outraises Billionaire-Backed Competition,
ROLLING STONE (Jan. 2, 2020, 4:48 P.M.), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politicsnews/bernie-sanders-no-billionaire-wins-money-chase-933125/. It is also worth noting that
the Senator has been highly critical of Citizens United for years. See Natasha Bach, Bernie Sanders: Citizens United Is Creating An ‘Oligarchic Form Of Society’, HUFFINGTON
POST (March 27, 2014, 6:04 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bernie-sanders-oligarchy_n_5045041.
234 See Cara Korte, Bernie Sanders Knocks Rivals for Taking Donations from Billionaires, CBS NEWS (Dec. 16, 2019, 1:04 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bernie-sandersknocks-rivals-for-taking-donations-from-billionaires/.
235 See Shane Goldmacher, Biden Campaign Drops Opposition to Super PAC Support,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/us/politics/joe-biden-super-pac.html.
236 See Kotch, supra note 28 (listing each Democrat who relied on small-dollar donations to outraise and defeat their incumbent Republican opponent in the 2018 mid-term
elections).
237 See RYAN GRIM, WE GOT PEOPLE: FROM JESSE JACKSON TO ALEXANDRIA OCASIOCORTEZ, THE END OF BIG MONEY AND THE RISE OF A MOVEMENT 356 (2019); Karl EversHillstrom, Ocasio-Cortez Enters the House with Highest Portion of Small Contributions,
OPENSECRETS (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/12/ocasio-cortezenters-the-house-as-most-popular-member-with-small-donors/ (showing that sixty-two
percent of Ocasio-Cortez’s fundraising came from small-dollar donations of less than
$200).
238 See Jake Johnson, Without Dialing for Dollars or Lobbyist Meetings, Ocasio-Cortez
Raised More Money Than Any Other House Democrat in Third Quarter, COMMON DREAMS
(Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/11/27/without-dialing-dollarsor-lobbyist-meetings-ocasio-cortez-raised-more-money-any.
239 See Stohr, supra note 18; Kotch, supra note 28.
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Once in power, and not beholden to corporate interests, these
lawmakers could conceivably address corporate political dominance via their electoral mandate.240 The most effective way to address the power imbalance would be to leave Citizens United alone
altogether and work instead to make corporations more democratic.241 Congressional lawmakers could federalize corporate
charterships and thereby mandate the two corporate reforms discussed here—increasing worker ownership and worker control.242
But David G. Yosifon believed that the very power distributed
to corporate boards by Citizens United would in all likelihood prevent reform efforts.243 Writing in 2011, Yosifon acknowledged that
sweeping regulations were likely not politically salient at that
time.244 Instead, he argued that some future “hot moment” of political focus on corporations would be needed to carry these reforms out.245
There is evidence that the “hot moment” is nearing, if not already upon us.246 Business Roundtable’s new purpose statement
may be evidence that CEOs recognize as much and are attempting

240 See Navin Nayak, Progressive Democrats Have a Solution for America’s Distrust of
Politicians: Stop Accepting Corporate PAC Money, NBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2018, 5:21 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/progressive-democrats-have-solution-america-sdistrust-politicians-stop-accepting-ncna925806.
241 See Greenfield, supra note 19.
242 See Palladino, supra note 86, at 134 (citing Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable
Capitalism Act for proposing this course of action). Demands for federal incorporation in
the United States, though mostly forgotten, are nothing new. Federal incorporation gained
serious consideration from Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, who recognized that individualized state charterships (like we have now) incentivize a “race to the
bottom” of low standards for corporations. See Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant Trends in
Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 305, 340 n.155 (1937). Efforts to pass
federal incorporation statutes in congress, and thus leverage chartership to regulate business behavior, have essentially vanished following the 1930s. See HURST, supra note 107,
at 75.
243 Yosifon, supra note 55, at 1237–38.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 See Lauren Gambino, ‘Not the Billionaires’: Why Small-Dollar Donors are Democrats’ New Powerhouse, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/10/democrats-small-dollar-donors-essential-bernie-sanders
(“Though some critics say the pledges are largely symbolic—corporate-PAC donations account for only a small percentage of total contributions for incumbents and even less for
first-time candidates—they tap into the growing public frustration over the role of big
money in politics since the supreme court’s 2010 Citizens United decision opened the door
for limitless spending on elections.”).
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to preemptively dissuade the heat.247 In fact, one CEO admitted
that the new statement was necessary because “people are asking
fundamental questions about how well capitalism is serving society.”248
Understanding not just how well capitalism is working, but precisely who in society is being served by the capitalist status quo, is
essential in seeking to mobilize a popular front to change it. While
the lopsided percentages of corporate equity ownership along class
lines is a disturbing symbol of the inequality inherent in our capitalist system, these percentages also indicate that those on the
“bottom” have much to gain and little to lose from pursuing radical
corporate reforms.249 In a sense, the bottom half of households
would have 0.8% of corporate equity “to lose” with the prospect of
gaining twenty percent in return.250 While the upper- and uppermiddle classes, who are much more invested in corporate equity,
would conceivably fight tooth and nail to maintain the shareholder
primacy and distribution of corporate surplus so beneficial to
them, the electoral numbers are only on their side if working-class
voters remain politically divided and discouraged from participating in the political process.251 Thus, a major party re-alignment
along class lines seems to be an important precursor to the kind of
electoral mandate necessary to enact radical corporate reforms.252
That re-alignment may be on the horizon.253
247 See Business Roundtable, supra note 197; Alan Murray, America’s CEOs Seek a
New Purpose for the Corporation, FORTUNE (Aug. 19, 2019, 4:30 AM), https://fortune.com/longform/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations-purpose/ (making a statement
that corporations are going to extend consideration beyond merely that of shareholders to
other corporate constituents).
248 Murray, supra note 247.
249 See Holmberg, supra note 34; Palladino, supra note 86, at 136; FEDERAL RESERVE,
SUPRA NOTE 153 (showing that the bottom fifty percent of wealth-holders in the United
States own only 0.6.% of corporate equity).
250 See Gowan & Lawrence, supra note 182.
251 See Dustin Guastella, White-Collar Populism, 35 JACOBIN 42, 44 (2019) (describing
the professionalization of American politics over the twentieth century and how well-intentioned efforts to “clean up” politics had the effect of lowering [working-class] participation,
“. . . by helping discourage participation in elections, the professionals increased their
power as a constituency while weakening that of the working class”).
252 See Matt Karp, Is This the Future Liberals Want?, 35 JACOBIN 52, 63 (2019) (“[W]hat
is required to challenge the power of the ultrarich [is] a politics that does not treat lowerincome voters as a kind of passive supplement for professional liberals, but one that can
put the new working class itself at the center of the action.”).
253 See Ryan Grim, A New Electorate: Can the Bernie Sanders Campaign Alter the
Course of the Democratic Party?, INTERCEPT (Jan. 3, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/01/03/bernie-sanders-democratic-party-2020-presidential-election (describing the ways in which Bernie Sanders 2020 presidential campaign focused on organizing
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Altogether, public distaste for corporate political domination
and influence is growing.254 The consequences of Citizens United
have turbo-charged this distaste.255 Politicians leaning into this
frustration have discovered an effective way to fundraise and win
elections through grassroots movement building.256 Once actual
political power is achieved via the “small-dollar revolution,” this
power can and should translate into legislative reforms of corporate governance.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Citizens United, as a widely unpopular Supreme Court
decision, has become a rhetorical symbol for the outsized, unaccountable role corporations play in American politics. Thus, Citizens United has been, and should continue to be, milked for all its
anti-corporate mobilizing worth. However, those wisely criticizing
the case ought not dwell on the issues of free speech and stripping
corporations of their constitutional personhood but get right to the
heart of the problem—the power imbalance between labor and
capital. The blatant illegitimacy, hyper-exploitation, and soaring
inequality created via the increased political speaking power of
corporations following Citizens United must be brought to light.
By exposing these lesser-discussed problems accelerated by Citizens United, those who hope to redistribute corporate power for
workers can use an anti-corporate electoral mandate as a vehicle
to enact transformative corporate reforms, essentially democratizing the economy.

working-class voters, staking success on the possibility of turning out low-propensity voters
in high numbers).
254 See Gambino, supra note 246 (showing that pledges against corporate PAC money
resonate with those frustrated with big money in politics).
255 See id. (describing how candidates are moving away from the traditional fundraising tactics of lobbyist meetings and expensive fundraising events which gave groups with
the resources outsized access to and influence on politicians).
256 See id.; Kotch, supra note 28 (describing candidates raising money through ads touting their independence from corporate PAC money).
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In many ways, the state has been consumed by its own creation—the corporation.257 Amazon attempted to cannibalize the
election of its home city.258 Political expenditures from corporations following Citizens United have ballooned.259 Over a third of
the voting-age population do not participate in elections as voter
turnout in the United States continues to fall behind peer-democracies.260 And inequality is rising, reaching its highest level in fifty
years in 2018.261
Despite these developments, there is reason to hope. By rejecting outlandish corporate spending, working people have revolutionized campaign financing one small-dollar donation at a
time.262 It seems that the decision coming from a politicized Supreme Court has only fueled nascent activism to neutralize and
overcome corporate interests. The key to lasting change must be
to push beyond, merely, the way things used to be towards new
levels of radical democracy in the workplace.

257 To paraphrase Justice White in First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
809 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
258 See Higgins, supra note 8 (quoting politicians and pundits who condemned Amazon’s move).
259 See ECONOMICS FOR INCLUSIVE PROSPERITY, ELECTION LAW AND POLITICAL
ECONOMY 5 (Feb. 2019), https://econfip.org/policy-brief/election-law-and-political-economy/# (“In the wake of [Citizens United], independent expenditures rose from $330 million
in 2008 to $1.0 billion in 2012 and $1.4 billion in 2016.”).
260 See Palmer & Wilson, supra note 60.
261 See Telford, supra note 150 (using the Gini index as a measure of inequality, 2018
marked the highest level since income inequality had begun to be measured in the United
States fifty years ago).
262 See Carney, supra note 232 (“[T]he growing number of average Americans joining
the donor pool raises the intriguing possibility that culture shifts could change the face of
fundraising . . . .”).

